Treasury Management Update

Quarter Ended 30 June 2020

This report is intended for the use and assistance of customers of Link Group. It should not be regarded as a substitute for the exercise by the recipient of its own judgement. Link Group exists to provide its clients with advice primarily on borrowing and investment. We are not legal experts and we have not obtained legal advice in giving our opinions and interpretations in this paper. Clients are advised to seek expert legal advice before taking action as a result of any advice given in this paper. Whilst Link Group makes every effort to ensure that all information provided by it is accurate and complete, it does not guarantee the correctness or the due receipt of such information and will not be held responsible for any errors therein or omissions arising there from. Furthermore, Link Group shall not be held liable in contract, tort or otherwise for any loss or damage (whether direct, or indirect or consequential) resulting from negligence, delay or failure on the part of Link Group or its officers, employees or agents in procuring, presenting, communicating or otherwise providing information or advice whether sustained by Link Group customer or any third party directly or indirectly making use of such information or advice, including but not limited to any loss or damage resulting as a consequence of inaccuracy or errors in such information or advice. All information supplied by Link Group should only be used as a factor to assist in the making of a business decision and should not be used as a sole basis for any decision.

Treasury services are provided by Link Treasury Services Limited (registered in England and Wales No. 2652033). Link Treasury Services Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority only for conducting advisory and arranging activities in the UK as part of its Treasury Management Service. FCA register number 150403. Registered office: 6th Floor, 65 Gresham Street, London, EC2V 7NQ.

Contents

1. Economic Background 3
2. Interest Rate Forecast 6
3. Annual Investment Strategy 8
4. New Borrowing 13
5. Debt Rescheduling 15
6. Compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits 16

APPENDIX 1: Prudential and Treasury Indicators as at 30 June 2020 17

Treasury Management Update

Quarter Ended 30 June 2020

The CIPFA (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy) Code of Practice for Treasury Management recommends that members be updated on treasury management activities regularly (annual, mid-year or quarterly reports). This report, therefore, ensures this Council is implementing best practice in accordance with the Code.

1. Economic Background

UK. Economic growth 2020 started with optimistic business surveys pointing to an upswing in growth after the ending of political uncertainty as a result of the decisive result of the general election in December settled the Brexit issue. However, the three monthly GDP statistics in January were disappointing, being stuck at 0.0% growth. Since then, the whole world has changed as a result of the coronavirus outbreak. The overall growth rate in quarter 1 was -2.2%, -1.7% y/y. However, the main fall in growth did not occur until April when it came in at -24.5% y/y after the closedown of whole sections of the economy. What is uncertain, however, is the extent of the damage that will have been done to businesses by the end of the lockdown period, how consumer confidence and behaviour may be impacted afterwards, whether there could be a second wave of the outbreak, how soon a vaccine will be created and then how quickly it can be administered to the population. This leaves huge uncertainties as to how quickly the economy will recover to what was formerly regarded as normality. However, some changes during lockdown are likely to be long lasting e.g. a shift to online purchasing, working from home, etc. The lockdown has also had a sharp effect in depressing expenditure by consumers which means their level of savings have increased and debt has fallen. This could provide fuel for a potential surge in consumer expenditure once some degree of normality returns.

Although the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, we still have much uncertainty as to whether there will be a reasonable trade deal achieved by the end of 2020. At the end of June, the UK government rejected extending the transition period beyond 31 December 2020. This has increased the chances of a no-deal **Brexit.** However, the most likely outcome is expected to be a slim deal on trade in order to minimise as much disruption as possible. However, uncertainty is likely to prevail until the deadline date which will act as a drag on recovery.

After the Monetary Policy Committee left **Bank Rate** unchanged at 0.75% in January 2020, the onset of the coronavirus epidemic in March forced it into making two emergency cuts in Bank Rate first to 0.25% and then to 0.10%. These cuts were accompanied by an increase **in quantitative easing (QE),** essentially the purchases of gilts (mainly) by the Bank of England of £200bn. In June, the MPC decided to add a further £100bn of QE purchases of gilts, but to be implemented over an extended period to the end of the year. The total stock of QE purchases will then amount to £745bn. It is not currently thought likely that the MPC would go as far as to cut Bank Rate into negative territory, although the Governor of the Bank of England has said all policy measures will be considered. The Governor also recently commented about

an eventual tightening in monetary policy – namely that he favours unwinding QE before raising interest rates. Some forecasters think this could be as far away as five years.

The Government and the Bank were also very concerned to **stop people losing their jobs** during this lockdown period. Accordingly, the Government introduced various schemes to subsidise both employed and self-employed jobs for three months to the end of June while the country is locked down. It also put in place a raft of other measures to help businesses access loans from their banks, (with the Government providing guarantees to the banks against losses), to tide them over the lockdown period when some firms may have little or no income. However, at the time of writing, this leaves open a question as to whether some firms will be solvent, even if they take out such loans, and some may also choose to close as there is, and will be, insufficient demand for their services. The furlough scheme was subsequently extended for another three months to October, but with employers having to take on graduated increases in paying for employees during that period. The Bank of England expects the unemployment rate to double to 8%.

The Government measures to support jobs and businesses will result in a huge increase in the annual budget deficit for the current year, from about 2% to nearly 17%. **The ratio of debt to GDP is also likely to increase from 80% to around 105%.** In the Budget in March, the Government also announced a large increase in spending on infrastructure; this will also help the economy to recover once the lockdown is ended. Economic statistics during June were giving a preliminary indication that the economy was recovering faster than previously expected. However, it may be a considerable time before economic activity recovers fully to its previous level.

Inflation. The annual inflation rate dropped to 0.5% in May from 0.8% in April and could reach zero by the end of the year. Inflation rising over 2% is unlikely to be an issue for the MPC over the next two years as the world economy will be heading into a recession; this has caused a glut in the supply of oil which initially fell sharply in price, although the price has recovered somewhat more recently. Other UK domestic prices will also be under downward pressure; wage inflation was already on a downward path over the last half year and is likely to continue that trend in the current environment where unemployment will be rising significantly. In May's Monetary Policy Report, the Bank of England predicted that inflation would hit their 2% target by 2022. This was in the context of its forecast that GDP would rise by 3% in 2022 after a recovery during 2021. While inflation could even turn negative in the Eurozone, this is currently not likely in the UK.

USA. Growth in quarter 1 of 2020 fell by an annualised 5.0% and will fall sharply in quarter 2. Once coronavirus started to impact the US in a big way, the Fed took decisive action by cutting rates twice by 0.50%, and then 1.00%, in March, all the way down to 0.00 – 0.25%. Near the end of March, Congress agreed a $2trn stimulus package (worth about 10% of GDP) and new lending facilities announced by the Fed which could channel up to $6trn in temporary financing to consumers and firms over the coming months. Nearly half of the first figure is made up of permanent fiscal transfers to households and firms, including cash payments of $1,200 to individuals.

The loans for small businesses, which convert into grants if firms use them to maintain their payroll, will cost $367bn and 100% of the cost of lost wages for four months will also be

covered. In addition there was $500bn of funding from the Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund which will provide loans for hard-hit industries, including $50bn for airlines.

Non-farm payrolls unexpectedly increased by 2.5 million jobs in May, beating market expectations of an 8 million fall, and after declining by a record 20.7 million in April. The figures suggest that the economic recovery in the US may happen much faster than initially expected. Some states started reopening in mid-May after a two-month shutdown but a few have had to reimpose localised lockdowns since then.

EUROZONE. The Eurozone economy shrank by 3.6% on quarter in the first three months of 2020. So far, the ECB has been by far the most important institution in helping to contain the impact of coronavirus and the crisis on financial markets. Since 12th March, it has implemented a range of new policies including providing additional cheap loans for commercial banks and easing capital requirements for the banking sector. But most importantly, the ECB has stepped up and reformed its asset purchase programmes. So far, it has increased its planned asset purchases for this year by €1,470bn on top of the €20bn per month which it was already committed to. The new purchases consist of an additional €120bn within the existing Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), and €1,350bn in the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). At its 4 June monetary policy meeting, the ECB Governing Council also committed to continue net asset purchases under the PEPP until at least the end of June 2021 and to continue to reinvest maturing principal payments under the PEPP until at least end-2022. It has also made clear that it would not hesitate to top up PEPP as much as needed to contain the risk of a crisis.

Just as important as the size of the PEPP is its flexibility. Whereas previous asset purchase programmes adhered to strict issuer limits, the PEPP was designed to be flexible across "time, asset classes and jurisdictions". This means that the ECB can act in the interests of the euro-zone as a whole rather than having to treat each national bond market equally. However, while this overall programme will provide protection over the next year or so, some vulnerable countries, particularly Italy, already started the crisis with a high level of debt to GDP and the crisis will make that level even worse at the same time as GDP growth prospects will have worsened. This leaves a big question over 'what happens after then when financial markets will be concerned that those debt levels are unsustainable?'

What is currently missing is a major coordinated EU response of fiscal action by all national governments to protect jobs, support businesses directly and promote economic growth by expanding government expenditure on e.g. infrastructure. The EU's recently-proposed rescue fund, (officially designated "Next Generation EU"), is a major first step towards financial integration in the EU. However, it is striking just how small this package is as the proposed €500 billion of grants amount to about 0.6% of average annual euro-zone GDP (over the seven-year budget period). It will therefore supply relatively little support to the weaker and more vulnerable countries within the EU. This has therefore left individual national governments to implement a patchwork of support measures within each country. This shows up how far away the EU is from being an effective fiscal union.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium-term risks have also been increasing. The major feature of 2019 was the trade war with the US. However, this has been eclipsed by being the

first country to be hit by the coronavirus outbreak; this resulted in a lockdown of the country and a major contraction of economic activity in February-March 2020. The Chinese economy shrank 6.8% y/y in Q1 2020, following 6% y/y growth in Q4 of 2019. Ongoing economic issues remain, in needing to make major progress to eliminate excess industrial capacity and to switch investment from property construction and infrastructure to consumer goods production. It also needs to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems. The post Covid government measures to stimulate more infrastructure investment are likely to result in an increase in inefficient low reward investment.

JAPAN has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth for years and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy. Japan appears to have escaped the worst effects of the virus - as yet.

WORLD GROWTH. The trade war between the US and China on tariffs was a major concern to financial markets and was depressing worldwide growth during 2019. This year, coronavirus is the inevitable big issue which is going to sweep around most countries in the world and have a major impact in causing a world recession in growth in 2020.

2. Interest Rate Forecast

The Council's treasury advisor, Link Group, provided the following forecast on 31 March 2020.

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View								
	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22
Bank Rate View	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 Month LIBID	0.45	0.40	0.35	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
6 Month LIBID	0.60	0.55	0.50	0.45	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
12 Month LIBID	0.75	0.70	0.65	0.60	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
5yr PWLB Rate	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10
10yr PWLB Rate	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30
25yr PWLB Rate	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.70	2.70
50yr PWLB Rate	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50

The above table is based on PWLB certainty rates – gilt yields plus 180bps.

Uncertainty over Brexit caused the MPC to leave Bank Rate unchanged during 2019 and at its January 2020 meeting. However, since then the coronavirus outbreak has transformed the economic landscape: in March, the MPC took emergency action twice to cut Bank Rate first to 0.25%, and then to 0.10%. It is now unlikely to rise for the next two years pending a protracted recovery of the economy from this huge set back.

Our central assumption is that there will be some form of muddle through agreement on a reasonable form of Brexit trade deal but the coronavirus outbreak could affect the timing of reaching a deal. As there is so much uncertainty around the impact of, and pace of recovery from this outbreak, the above forecasts currently only cover two years, not three as provided in the past.

GILT YIELDS / PWLB RATES. There was much speculation during the second half of 2019 that bond markets were in a bubble which was driving bond prices up and yields down to historically very low levels. The context for that was heightened expectations that the US could have been heading for a recession in 2020, and a general background of a downturn in world economic growth, especially due to fears around the impact of the trade war between the US and China, together with inflation generally at low levels in most countries and expected to remain subdued; these conditions were conducive to very low bond yields. While inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last 30 years in lowering inflation expectations, the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers: this means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer spending, inflation, etc. This has pulled down the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in financial markets over the last 30 years. We have therefore seen, over the last year, many bond yields up to 10 years in the Eurozone turn negative. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby 10 year yields have fallen below shorter term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession. The other side of this coin is that bond prices are elevated as investors would be expected to be moving out of riskier assets i.e. shares, in anticipation of a downturn in corporate earnings and so selling out of equities.

Gilt yields had therefore already been on a falling trend during the last year up until the coronavirus crisis hit western economies. Since then, we have seen gilt yields fall sharply to unprecedented lows as investors panicked during March in selling shares in anticipation of impending recessions in western economies and moved cash into safehaven assets i.e. government bonds. However, major western central banks started massive quantitative easing purchases of government bonds which has acted to maintain downward pressure on government bond yields at a time when there has been a huge and quick expansion of government expenditure financed by issuing government bonds; in normal times this would have caused bond yields to rise sharply. At the close of the day on 30 June, all gilt yields from 1 to 5 years were slightly negative while even 25-year yields were at only 0.71 and 50 year at 0.54%. Equity markets have enjoyed a rebound since the lows of March as confidence has started to return among investors that the worst is over and recovery is now on the way.

However, HM Treasury imposed two changes of **margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates** in 2019-20 without any prior warning; the first on 9 October 2019, added an additional 1% margin over gilts to all PWLB rates. That increase was then at least partially reversed for some forms of borrowing on 11 March 2020, but not for mainstream General Fund capital schemes, at the same time as the Government announced in the Budget a programme of increased spending on infrastructure expenditure. It also announced that there would be a consultation with local authorities on possibly further amending these margins; this was to end on 4 June but the date has since been put back to 31 July. It is clear that the Treasury will no longer allow local authorities to borrow money from the PWLB to purchase commercial property if the aim is solely to generate an income stream (assets for yield).

Following the changes on 11 March 2020 in margins over gilt yields, the current situation is as follows: -

- **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 200 basis points (G+200bps)
- **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 180 basis points (G+180bps)

- **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
- **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
- **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)

As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates (gilts plus 180bps) above shows, there is likely to be little upward movement in PWLB rates over the next two years as it will take economies a prolonged period to recover all the momentum they will lose in the sharp recession that will be caused during the coronavirus shut down period. Inflation is also likely to be very low during this period and could even turn negative in some major western economies during 2020-21.

3. Annual Investment Strategy

The Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2020/21, which includes the Annual Investment Strategy, was approved by the Council on 6th February 2020. It sets out the Council's investment priorities as being:

- Security of capital;
- Liquidity; and
- Yield.

The Council will aim to achieve the optimum return (yield) on its investments commensurate with proper levels of security and liquidity. In the current economic climate it is considered appropriate to keep investments short term to cover cash flow needs, but also to seek out value available in periods up to 24 months.

Creditworthiness.

Although the credit rating agencies changed their outlook on many UK banks from stable to negative outlook during this quarter, due to upcoming risks to banks' earnings and asset quality during the economic downturn caused by the pandemic, the majority of ratings were affirmed due to the continuing strong credit profiles of UK banks.

Although CDS prices, (these are market indicators of credit risk), for UK banks spiked upwards at the end of March due to the liquidity crisis throughout financial markets, those CDS prices have returned to more average levels since then.

Officers can confirm that the approved limits within the Annual Investment Strategy were not breached during the quarter ended 30 June 2020. The £5 million limit on the Council's current account was exceeded during the quarter to ensure the Council had sufficient funds to pay the Business Rate Support Grants.

The average level of funds available for investment purposes during the quarter was **£41.2m**. These funds were available on a temporary basis, and the level of funds available was mainly dependent on the timing of precept payments, receipt of grants and progress on the Capital Programme. The Council holds **£20.5m** core cash balances for investment purposes (i.e. funds available for more than one year). The investment portfolio yield for the first three months of the year was 0.68%. This is the weighted average rate of interest earned on investments held

by the Council between 1 April and 30 June. The 1.06% average interest rate shown in the table below is the weighted average rate of interest on outstanding investments on 30 June.

Investments at 30 June 2020

	Amount £	Average Interest Rate %
Managed By NHDC		
Banks	2,000,000	1.12
Building Societies	1,000,000	0.20
Local Authorities	20,000,000	0.90
Government	15,000,000	0.01
NHDC Total	**38,000,000**	**0.88**
Managed by Tradition		
Building Societies	4,500,000	1.45
Tradition Total	**4,500,000**	**1.45**
TOTAL	**42,500,000**	**1.06**

In percentage terms, this equates to:

	Percentage
Government	35
Local Authorities	47
Banks	5
Building Societies	13

The approved 20/21 strategy is that no more than 60% of investments should be placed with Building Societies with a maximum value of £16M. The value at 30 June was £5.5M.

The pie chart below shows the spread of investment balances as at 30 June 2020. This is a snapshot in time that demonstrates the diversification of investments.



The chart below shows the Council’s investment maturity profile.



The Council's Original budgeted investment return for 2020/21 was £0.300M. The projection at the 1st quarter is a reduction of £0.115M and based on current investments and cashflow forecasts it is expected that the Council will generate £0.185M of interest. The large decrease in investment income from the Original budget is mainly due to a significant reduction in interest rates. Base Rate was reduced from 0.75% to 0.1% in March which had a huge impact on Interest rates. This is coupled with a reduction in cashflow due to Covid-19 and a need to keep investments fluid in order to pay the Small Business Grants on demand.

The graph below shows the average rate of interest on outstanding investments at 30 June.



The higher rates achieved through Tradition reflect that these are longer-term investments. In general, the Council can currently achieve similar rates for the same length of investment. The Council only undertakes new investments through Tradition where the rate achieved (after fees) are greater than what the Council could achieve for a similar investment.

The treasury indicator below shows the capital value and expected income from Capital Investment assets, alongside any borrowing that is attached to those assets and the expected cost of that borrowing.

Year	Capital value of investment assets £m	Original Expected annual income from investment assets £m	Revised Expected annual income from investment assets £m	Loans linked to investment assets £m	Expected annual borrowing costs for loans linked to investment assets £m
2020/21	25.820	1.173	1.173	3.78	0.208
2021/22	29.820	1.173	1.173	3.78	0.208
2022/23	33.820	1.223	1.223	3.78	0.208
2023/24	37.820	1.273	1.273	4.891	0.269
2024/25	41.820	1.273	1.273	11.516	0.633

New borrowing costs are based on a 25 year Annuity loan from PWLB and an MRP life of 40 years.

4. New Borrowing

No long term borrowing was undertaken during the quarter ended 30 June 2020

Based on 1st quarter estimate for capital expenditure, the Council's capital financing requirement (CFR) for 2020/21 is expected to be £2.262M (-£5.595M at the end of 19/20). The CFR denotes the Council's underlying need to borrow for capital purposes. If the CFR is positive the Council may borrow from the PWLB or the market (external borrowing) or from internal balances (internal borrowing). If the CFR is negative, the Council has more cash investments than borrowing. The balance of external and internal borrowing is generally driven by market conditions.

It is anticipated that long term borrowing will be undertaken during this financial year if the Capital Programme is fully spent.

Loans Outstanding at 30 June 2020:

	Amount	Average Interest Rate
	£	%
Public Works Loans Board	£428k	9.82

Estimated outstanding debt:

Year	Forecast Borrowing £m	Forecast other long-term liabilities £m	Forecast Total External Debt £m	Operational Boundary £m	Authorised Limit £m
31st March 2020	0.423	2.125	2.548	4.0	10
31st March 2021 (Forecast)	4.185	1.622	5.807	6.9	12
31st March 2022 (Forecast)	3.978	1.119	5.097	6.9	12
31st March 2023 (Forecast)	3.769	0.616	4.385	5.5	12
31st March 2024 (Forecast)	4.670	0.113	4.783	6.0	12
31st March 2025 (Forecast)	11.030	0	11.030	12.1	18

* Comprises the finance lease relating to Letchworth Multi-storey car park and the forecast impact of the finance lease for waste vehicles.

The external borrowing forecast can be used to give an indication of the borrowing that may be required, which is combined with outstanding existing borrowing. The Council will also borrow for short-term cash-flow needs if required. The actual borrowing that is taken out will depend on the latest forecasts and the offers that are available at the time that it is required. There will also be a consideration of when any other borrowing becomes due, with the aim of achieving a spread of these dates. This is to try and avoid refinancing risk. The Council is required to set indicators for the maturity structure of its borrowing. Given the low level of borrowing that the Council currently has and is forecast to have, it is considered appropriate to maintain full flexibility as to the exact duration of any borrowing undertaken.

To manage refinancing risk, the Council sets limits on the maturity structure of its borrowing. However, these indicators are set relatively high to provide sufficient flexibility to respond to opportunities to repay or take out new debt (if it was required), while remaining within the parameters set by the indicators. Due to the low level of existing borrowing, the under 12 months limits have a broad range to allow for cash-flow borrowing (if it was required).

Maturity Period	Lower %	Upper %
Under 12 months	0	100
12 months to 2 years	0	50
2 years to 5 years	0	60
5 years to 10 years	0	70
10 years to 20 years	0	80
20 years and above	0	100

The Council may have a need to borrow in this financial year if the Capital Programme is fully spent so may need to apply a Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP).

There is a prudential indicator that compares the net cost of financing (i.e. borrowing costs less income generated from investments) with the net revenue budget of the Council. However, the indicator below considers the cost of borrowing as a % of the net revenue budget of the Council.

Year	Estimated cost of borrowing £m	Forecast net revenue budget £m	Estimated cost of borrowing as a % of net revenue budget
2020/21	0.249	17.274	1.44
2021/22	0.248	14.842	1.67
2022/23	0.247	14.797	1.67
2023/24	0.306	14.675	2.09
2024/25	0.668	14.675	4.55

The Council is required to set a prudential indicator that estimates financing costs (cost of borrowing less income from investments) as a percentage of its net revenue budget.

Year	Estimated cost of borrowing £m	Less: Forecast of interest earned £m	Net Financing Costs £m	Forecast net revenue budget £m	Estimated cost of borrowing as a % of net revenue budget
2020/21	0.249	0.185	0.064	17.274	0.370
2021/22	0.248	0.344	-0.096	14.842	-0.647
2022/23	0.247	0.353	-0.106	14.797	-0.716
2023/24	0.306	0.380	-0.074	14.675	-0.504
2024/25	0.668	0.334	0.334	14.675	2.276

Due to the overall financial position and the underlying need to borrow for capital purposes (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), new external borrowing will be required if the Capital Programme is fully spent during the year.

PWLB rates have fallen a little between the start and end of the quarter with not a great deal of volatility between those dates. The 50 year PWLB target rate for new long term borrowing was at 2.30% during the quarter.

5. Debt Rescheduling

No debt rescheduling was undertaken during the quarter.

6. Compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits

It is a statutory duty for the Council to determine and keep under review the affordable borrowing limits. The Council’s approved Treasury and Prudential Indicators, (affordability limits), are included in the approved TMSS.

During the quarter ended 30 June 2020, the Council has operated within the treasury and prudential indicators set out in the Council’s Treasury Management Strategy Statement and in compliance with the Council's Treasury Management Practices. The £5 million limit on the Council’s current account was exceeded during the quarter to ensure the Council had sufficient funds to pay the Business Rate Support Grants. The prudential and treasury Indicators are shown in Appendix 1.

Appendix 1: Prudential and Treasury Indicators for 2020-21 as at 30 June 2020

Treasury Indicators	2020/21 Budget £'000	31.3.20 Actual £'000
Authorised limit for external debt	12,000	423
Operational boundary for external debt	6,900	423
Gross external debt	5,807	423
Investments	26,000	42,500
Net borrowing	-20,193	-42,077

Maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing - upper and lower limits		
Under 12 months	18	18
12 months to 2 years	18	18
2 years to 5 years	61	61
5 years to 10 years	69	69
10 years to 20 years *1	7	7
20 years to 30 years *1	250	250

Upper limit for principal sums invested over 365 days	11,000 Max	0

Prudential Indicators	2020/21 Budget £'000	31.3.20 Actual £'000
Capital expenditure	10,519	83
Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)	3,800	-5,595
In year borrowing requirement	3,780	3,170
Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream	-0.454%	0.370%